“Que doivent faire les blancs ?” Forthcoming. Mouvements, La Découverte.
In our racially unjust societies, what should white people do? To what specific normative standards might we have good reason to hold white people accountable? In this paper, I survey answers to this question that recent work in ethics, social epistemology, and philosophy of race suggests.
“Cooperation: With or Without Shared Intentions,” 2022. Ethics 132 (2): 414-444.
In this paper, I refute an orthodoxy of shared agency theory, namely the view that shared intentions to φ are necessary and sufficient for φ to count as an instance of cooperation. I then take stock and articulate the everyday conception of cooperation that this refutation implies.
“Agency and Practical Reasoning” (with Jennifer M. Morton), 2022. In Luca Ferrero (ed.), Handbook in the Philosophy of Agency, Routledge.
Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry inquires into what practical reasoning consists in.
“Présentation. L’empirisme rationaliste de Durkheim et Mauss,” 2017. Introduction to Émile Durkheim et Marcel Mauss, De quelques formes primitives de classification, Presses Universitaires de France.
In this introduction, I flesh out Durkheim and Mauss’s account of the acquisition of the concept of class, and I argue that their account steers a middle course between traditional strands of rationalism and empiricism.
Drafts available upon request
A paper about normativity in shared agency (revise & resubmit)
Do participants in shared activities owe to one another to do their part in their common plan? In this paper, I argue that there is no one-size-fits-all answer to this question, and I offer, accordingly, a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency.
A paper about what is involved in acting together (revise & resubmit)
What is involved in sharing one’s agency with others? Most shared agency theorists claim that acting together requires shared intentions. This paper dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states.
A paper about cooperativeness (under review)
This paper focuses on cooperativeness, i.e. the deep and stable disposition to think and act as a good partner in shared activity. Therein, I explain what cooperativeness is by inquiring into the job that possession of the concept of cooperativeness might do for us.
A paper about complicity
I develop a minimalist account of complicity, one on which complicity is, roughly, a matter of participating, along with others, in the enactment of a wrongful plan of action. One important reason why this account is minimalist is because it does not require that the accomplice’s mental states register the fact of their participation in wrongdoing. Accordingly, my account is well suited to capture the wide distribution of complicitous responsibility in our densely interconnected and structurally unjust social world.