“Agency and Practical Reasoning,” (with Jennifer M. Morton) forthcoming in Luca Ferrero (ed.), Handbook in the Philosophy of Agency, Routledge.

Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry enquires into what practical reasoning consists in.

“Présentation. L’empirisme rationaliste de Durkheim et Mauss,” Introduction to Émile Durkheim et Marcel Mauss (2017), De quelques formes primitives de classification, Presses Universitaires de France.

In this introduction, I flesh out Durkheim and Mauss’s account of the acquisition of the concept of class, and I argue that their account steers a middle course between traditional strands of rationalism and empircism.

In Progress

Drafts available upon request

A paper on cooperation (revise/resubmit)

In this paper, I refute an orthodoxy of shared agency theory, namely the view that shared intentions to φ are necessary and sufficient for φ to count as cooperative. I then take stock and articulate the everyday conception of cooperation that this refutation implies.


A paper on slingshots in free logic

The slingshot is a family of logico-semantic arguments to the effect that some entities of some sort that one may want to include in one’s ontology are in fact redundant, and reduce to one—or a couple—of entities of that sort. In this paper, I explain how the slingshot can be deployed in free logics, negative and positive alike.

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